1 ACADEMIC ECONOMISTS = PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY: A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES by William J. Moore et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACADEMIC ECONOMISTS’ PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY: 
 
A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William J. Moore 
Robert J. Newman 
M. Dek Terrell 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June  2002 
  1 
 
  
 
 
  ACADEMIC ECONOMISTS= PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY: 
  A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES 
 
It has long been recognized that salaries for academic economists are substantially lower in 
the United Kingdom than in the United States.  The reasons for this phenomenon are far less 
obvious.  Is it because UK academic economists are innately less talented or less well trained?  Is it 
because the UK has a pay system that provides inadequate incentives to attract high quality 
individuals or to encourage greater work efforts?  Is it because the UK pay system discourages 
higher education institutions from competitively bidding up the salaries of productive scholars.  
Finally, does the UK pay system, which refuses to allow discipline pay differentials (except in 
medicine), create a monopsony situation whereby academic economists are paid less than their 
marginal products?  These questions motivate the analysis of this paper. 
There have been numerous studies of academic salaries in the US,
1 but relatively few in the 
UK (Bowen 1963, Metcalf 1970, Ward, 1998, and Blackaby and Frank 2000).  This is probably 
because salary information in the UK is regarded as strictly confidential, whereas faculty salaries at 
public universities in the US are regarded as public information.  In a recent paper, Moore, Newman, 
and Turnbull (1998) estimated a human capital earnings model to explain the variation in the salaries 
for a sample of academic economists in the US. The present study estimates a similar model using a 
sample of UK academic economists.  To our knowledge, this will be the first study to systematically 
compare the determinants of academic pay in two countries.   
While similar market forces operate in both countries, there are major institutional 
differences between the two academic labour markets. Our analysis estimates the magnitude of pay 
disparity between US and UK academic economists. In addition, we decompose the observed pay 
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disparity into that part attributed to differences in the amount of human capital and productivity 
levels and that part attributable to differences in rewards for similar characteristics. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the institutional characteristics of 
higher education compensation schemes in the two countries.  The next Section describes the 
samples and data collection process.  Section III presents the empirical model and summary 
statistics.  The regression results are presented in Section IV.  In the following Section, we 
decompose the gross salary differential between the two countries into its component parts.  Section 
VI compares the actual salaries of UK economists to their predicted salaries if they were in the US.  
The final Section summarizes our findings and conclusions. 
 
1. Compensation Schemes in the UK and US 
The US and UK higher education compensation schemes differ in at least four major ways. 
First, the central government provides funding for higher education in the UK.  In the US, private 
universities are funded through tuition and private donations and public universities are funded 
through tuition and state subsidies.  US universities are more diverse than those in the UK.  US 
universities differ substantially in terms of role, scope, mission, quality, and  pay structures (Brown, 
1965 and Tuckman, 1976). 
Second, most faculty members in the UK are paid according to a fixed national salary scale 
that is negotiated by the Association of University Teachers (AUT) and the University and College=s 
Employer Association (Williams, Blackstone, and Metcalf, 1974 and Bett, 1999).  The salary scale 
sets a minimum and a maximum and annual increments for all ranks below the professor rank.
2  
Lecturers and reader/senior lecturers receive uniform automatic pay increases under their respective 
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salary schedules.
3  Discretionary salary increments may be awarded for exceptional productivity 
once a year, but these rewards are rare (Ward, 1998 and Bett, 1999).  Professors= salaries are based 
on negotiations between each university=s personnel department and the individual.  The system 
does, however, impose a minimum on professors= salaries and on the average salaries a university 
may pay its professors as a whole.  Thus, if one professor is paid more than the average, at least one 
of his colleagues must receive less (Williams, Blackstone, and Metcalf, 1974).  One of the alleged 
virtues of the national salary schedule is that it helps avoid “unnecessary” competition for staff, 
which would push up costs (Higher Education Funding Council for England, May 1997).
4 
In the US, individual universities actively compete with each other and with non-academic 
employers to hire economists.  However, because of differences among universities in scope, 
mission and ability to pay, salaries of academic economists vary systematically across universities in 
the US. On average, faculty members at private universities receive higher salaries than those at 
public universities.  Among the elite universities (both public and private), salaries tend to be at the 
upper end of the distribution because they compete for the Atop@ scholars.  Within-rank salary 
differentials are highest at the professor level and lowest at the assistant professor level.  It is easier 
for the less well funded universities to compete at the entry level.  For reasons explained by Freeman 
(1975), the most productive research scholars in the US are concentrated among an elite group of 
well-funded institutions. In contrast, because of central funding and the lingering effects of the 
national salary schedule, the distribution of Atop@ talent is likely to be more evenly spread out among 
universities in the UK. 
Academic economists at major research universities in the US, like those in our sample, do 
not receive automatic uniform annual pay increases.  Pay increases are based on annual evaluations 
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at the department level in consultation with the Dean of the college.  In major universities, such as 
those included in this study, an individual=s research performance is accorded the greatest weight in 
determining pay increase (Katz, 1973; Siegfried and White, 1973; and Tuckman, 1976). Teaching 
and service are accorded less weight.  Funding difficulties may prevent pay raises from matching 
productivity growth, but most universities try to keep their faculty=s salaries in line with their 
accumulated output and market value to avoid losing them to other universities. 
Williams, Blackstone, and Metcalf (1974, p. 215) speculate that in the UK it is possible that 
central funding in conjunction with the national salary schedules and accompanying regulations 
Amay facilitate collusion among the universities acting as agents for the government, and that this 
monopsony situation results in lower salaries than would occur in a labor market without such 
scales.@  If this is true, we would expect US academic economists= salaries, which are determined in 
decentralized highly competitive markets, to be higher than salaries in the UK. 
Third, both countries use promotion tournament compensation schemes which pay according 
to an individual=s ordinal rank in an organization rather than the individual’s absolute output level 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981).  There are important differences, however, in the way the tournaments are 
operated in the two countries.  First, in the UK the promotion ranks and the associated pay scales 
(i.e., prizes), at least up to the professor level, are clearly delineated and fixed in advance.   
Promotions in the UK allow the individual to move from one pay scale to a higher one (i.e., from 
lecturer to reader/senior lecturer to professor).  In the US, the promotion ranks are known, but the 
associated pay is uncertain. 
Second, to be effective, promotions need to be based on performance measures that are 
closely related to the principal=s objective (Baker, 1992).  If the university wants to maximize its 
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perceived quality (i.e., reputation), as suggested by Freeman (1975), then faculty need to be 
promoted and rewarded on the basis of their relative research productivity.  According to Bowen 
(1963), longevity is an important consideration in all promotion decisions in the UK.  In addition, 
senior lecturer promotions primarily depend on teaching quality, whereas promotions to readers are 
based on research quality.  Promotions to professor require an outstanding research record, a 
national reputation, and administrative skills (Williams, Blackstone, and Metcalf, 1974).  For many 
years, the rank of professor in UK universities was reserved for a very select group and often there 
was only one professional chair per department and that person served as head of the department 
(Brown, 1963). 
At major research universities in the US, promotion decisions are based on the individual=s 
research performance and national reputation subject to some minimum teaching quality constraint 
(Katz, 1973; Tuckman, 1976; and McDowell, Singell, and Ziliak, 1999).  While it is normal for 
assistant professors and associate professors to serve six years in rank, outstanding researchers are 
often promoted earlier.  Weiss and Lillard (1982) reported that of the US disciplines surveyed, 
economics had the shortest mean time to promotion to both associate and full professor.  Finally, US 
economists generally receive a one-time increase in their permanent pay when they are promoted, 
but do not receive automatic future pay increases. 
To control costs, the UK system has placed limits on the proportion of faculty in the senior 
ranks (reader/senior lecturer and professor) at each university.  Periodically, the University Grants 
Council and government have raised the senior limit in response to market forces (Bett, 1999).  In 
contrast, most US universities do not place limits on the number of senior positions.  As a 
consequence, the proportion of professors is much higher in the US than in the UK.  Currently, less 
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than 25 percent of UK academic economists hold the rank of professor (Blackaby and Frank, 2000). 
 In our current samples, 38 percent of UK economists and 54 percent of US economists hold the rank 
of professor. 
Fourth, with the exception of medical pay, there are no explicit discipline pay differentials 
under the UK national salary schedules.  All lecturers and reader/senior lecturers are paid the same 
on the basis of their rank and grade regardless of external market conditions.  Professors are not 
covered by the national salary scale and there appears to be modest discipline pay differentials at this 
rank (Bowen, 1963 and Metcalf, 1970).  Under the national pay schedule, shortages occur in 
disciplines like economics with high opportunity costs and surpluses occur in disciplines with low 
opportunity costs.  UK universities have attempted to increase the salaries in disciplines facing 
shortages by hiring or promoting faculty to senior posts earlier than normal and by placing 
individuals higher up the national pay scales (Bowen, 1963 and Metcalf, 1970).  Also, as Williams, 
Blackstone, and Metcalf (1974) report it is not uncommon for UK universities to lower their hiring 
standards when faced with market shortages in various disciplines.  Recently, Machin and Oswald 
(2000) report that over the past decade salaries of UK academic economists have lagged behind 
those of private-sector economists by 20 to 30 percent.  As a consequence, the quality and quantity 
of UK citizens enrolled in Ph.D. programs and entering academe has declined dramatically.  They 
are being replaced by foreign students and faculty, who presumably face poorer alternatives at home. 
In the US, hiring and pay decisions are determined at the discipline or department level 
subject to review by higher university officials.  Decision makers try to keep up with external market 
conditions.  For this reason, discipline pay differentials are quite large.  For example, in 1995-96 
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economics professors in the US earned 40 percent more than professors in English, art, or music 
(Machin and Oswald, 2000). 
Because of internal institutional pressures, US universities face difficulties in keeping up 
with rapidly rising opportunity costs in a discipline (Freeman, 1975).  One method used to cope with 
shortages is to lower standards (Brown, 1965 and 1967) or to hire foreign-born academics.  The 
quality and quantity of US citizens majoring in economics at the undergraduate level and enrolling 
in economics graduate programs has been declining in recent years as the earnings of undergraduate 
business majors, MBAs, and law school graduates has soared (Siegfried and Stock, 1999 and 
Ehrenberg 1999). Consequently, foreign-born persons make up an increasing proportion of graduate 
enrollments and new faculty in economics in the US, just as they do in the UK. 
Rigid non-discipline pay schedules have important budgetary implications.  As Freeman 
(1975, p. 108) explains under a flexible wage regime, when a one percent change in wages is granted 
to a discipline accounting for X percent of the faculty budget, average wages change by X percent.  
In a world of rigid wages among disciplines, the same adjustment requires that all salaries change by 
one percent, an adjustment 1/X times as great.  Because the UK has a more rigid academic pay 
structure, if non-academic pay of economists rises equally in both countries, academic economists 
pay will grow more slowly in the UK than in the US. 
 
2.  The Data 
Data for this study are taken from individual vitae of full-time faculty members employed in 
US and UK universities. In the US, salary information and individual vita were provided by nine 
Ph.D. programs in economics for the 1992-93 academic year.  The nine programs were selected 
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through personal contacts and the willingness of their faculty to participate in the study.
5  Based on 
their faculty=s contributions to the top 36 economics journals for 1984-1993, these programs ranked 
from approximately 30 to 70 out of 80 US programs evaluated (Scott and Mitias, 1996).  Because 
our sample excludes the top 25 or so programs, our results may not generalize to the entire market.  
Nevertheless, the universities in our data set represent a substantial subset of that market. 
Initially, we attempted to collect UK data in a similar manner.  Letters soliciting individual 
vita and salary information were sent to the chairs of 85 economics departments.  Respondents 
indicated such information could not be provided because it is confidential.  Therefore, we sent e-
mails to approximately 1,000 academic economists at 60 universities whose addresses were 
available on the WEB.
6  We obtained complete data for 129 individuals. 
Admittedly, our UK sample is small.  Machin and Oswald (1999) report that there were 
1,420 academic staff included in the 1996 Economics and Econometric Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) and a number of other academic economists were included in the Management 
subject area.  Although small, our UK sample appears to be representative of the population of UK 
academic economists.  Table 1 compares our data with that collected in recent surveys by Blackaby 
and Frank (2000),  Booth and Burton (1999), Machin and Oswald (2000) and Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE)(1996).  Our sample shows a higher proportion of professors 
and a lower proportion of lecturers than the other studies.  We believe the lower proportion of 
lecturers may be due to the presence of the single salary structure and their belief that their salaries 
are fixed and unrelated to productivity.  Professors may have responded at a higher rate because their 
salaries are flexible and affected by productivity. 
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In terms of department quality, as measured by 1996 RAE scores, our sample has a higher 
proportion of respondents from level 4 programs and a lower proportion from level 1 and 2 
departments.  The level 4 response may be attributed in part to the fact that one of us was a visiting 
scholar at a level 4 department in the Fall 1999 semester and presented seminars related to this 
research topic at two level 4 departments. The low response rate for the level 1 and 2 departments 
was caused by the unavailability of e-mail addresses for many faculty members in these 
departments.  Finally, no female professors responded to our survey.  Overall, however, our sample 
does not appear to be substantially different than those of other studies. 
Our data set is particularly appropriate for our study.  Based on individual vita, it provides 
detailed information on individual characteristics such as experience, sex, education, quality of 
graduate training, as well as a variety of individual productivity measures described below. 
 
 
 
3.  The Empirical Model 
The dependent variable in all the reported regressions is the log of the 1999-2000 academic 
year salary as reported by each individual.
7  In the UK data we do not consider the London 
allowance as part of the base salary because it is a cost of living adjustment. We begin by defining 
the independent variables used in the analysis. Since we are interested in comparative analysis, the 
variables included in the empirical models are restricted to those available for both countries. 
Experience measures the years of academic employment subsequent to the date of the highest 
degree earned.  Experience is generally found to have a positive influence on academic salaries in 
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the US (Johnson and Stafford, 1974; Katz, 1978; and Tuckman and Lealey, 1975). Moore, Newman 
and Turnbull (1998) found that the positive experience-earnings relationship disappears as 
comprehensive measures of academic productivity are added to the regression specification. 
However, because of the automatic pay raises provided by the national salary schedule, we expect 
that experience will have a stronger impact on salaries in the UK, even after controlling for 
productivity. 
Seniority is defined as the number of years employed at the current institution. In contrast to 
the general observation in non-academic labor markets, several empirical studies of academic labour 
markets in the US find a negative relationship between seniority and earnings (Gordon, Morton and 
Braden 1974; Hoffman 1976; Ransom 1993). Ransom attributes the negative relationship to 
monopsony.  He argues that older workers with deeper roots in the community have higher moving 
costs and therefore their universities can pay them lower salaries without fear of losing their 
services.  Hallock (1995) found no evidence of a negative return to seniority at a unionized 
university.  His study is consistent with other US studies that show that unionization in higher 
education increases the salaries of full professors more than they increase the salaries of junior 
faculty (Brown and Stone, 1977; Freeman, 1978; and Barbezat, 1989).  
In a recent study by Moore, Newman and Turnbull (1998), the negative seniority-earnings 
relationship in academic labour markets has been called into question. They find that the negative 
effects of seniority disappear once productivity is taken into account. In the UK, we expect this 
variable to have a smaller influence on academic salaries because of the automatic pay increases 
mandated under the union negotiated national salary schedule. 
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We include three variables to measure the quality and quantity of an individual=s research 
productivity.  Level I Articles measures the number of articles published in the top-tier general 
interest economics journals.  These include:  American Economic Review, Econometrica, Economic 
Journal, Economica, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of 
Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, and the Review of 
Economics and Statistics.  
 Level II Articles counts the number of articles published in highly respected second-tier 
general interest journals and in the leading field journals.  We expand the list of 45 journals used by 
Moore, Newman and Turnbull (1998) by adding five European journals (see Appendix).   
Specifically, we added the European Economic Review, Journal of Royal Statistical Society, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, and Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy.
8 Though there may be some disagreement about some journals that are not 
included, the addition or deletion of a few journals on the list should not alter our basic results.   
The last publication variable, Total Other Pubs, includes all of the other publications listed 
on the individual=s vita.  This broad publication variable includes textbooks, academic books, 
comments, notes, and other miscellaneous documents that have been published, but it excludes 
working papers and book reviews.  We expect that all three publication variables to have a positive 
effect on salaries, but we anticipate that the marginal returns should be greater for Level I Articles 
than for Level II Articles. 
One important measure of the quality of an individual’s scholarly research is excluded from 
the comparative analysis. In our earlier study, we found that an individual’s career citations had a 
significant positive effect on the earnings distribution for US academic economists  (Moore, 
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Newman, and Turnbull, 1998).   Our results suggest that citations reflect an important measure of 
research quality and further, the return to citations is higher for those individuals who publish a 
smaller number of frequently cited papers than for those who publish a greater number of less 
frequently cited papers. Unfortunately, our attempts to incorporate career citations into the analysis 
were unsuccessful. For UK, economists we collected data on individual career citations from the 
Web of Science Citation Databases. This data base prevented us from eliminating self-cites and 
more importantly, we could not assign citations to coauthors on all published papers prior to 1984. 
This meant that UK citation counts suffered from a serious systematic undercount for all coauthors 
who were publishing papers prior to 1984; that is, most senior scholars who were not listed as the 
first author on their early-career papers.  Our attempts to incorporate career citations into the 
analysis produced results that were not plausible. Thus, despite our strong priors that citations 
represent an important measure of quality and hence, should influence relative earnings among 
research scholars, our citation data for UK economists do not adequately measure the true citation 
counts for all multiple authors.   
Chair Years is used to proxy an individual=s investments in administrative skills.  This 
variable is defined as the number of years the individual has served as chair, either currently or in 
the past.  There are a number of reasons for expecting this variable to have a positive influence on 
salary (Saks, 1977), and the US evidence supports this hypothesis (Siegfried and White, 1973; 
Ferber, 1974; Tuckman and Leshey, 1975; and Moore, Newman, and Turnbull, 1998).  Generally we 
would expect the payoffs to chair experience to be lower in the UK system because chairs receive 
extra compensation while serving but lose it when they leave office; whereas chairs in the US do not 
have their nominal salaries reduced when they leave office. 
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We also include a variable to capture any salary effects of Ph.D. quality, using a dummy 
variable that equals one if the individual received his Ph.D. degree from one of the top programs in 
economics.
9 It is well documented that in the US the average quality of academic economists 
measured in terms of their subsequent publication performance varies systematically with the quality 
of their Ph.D. program (see Hogan, 1973).  For this reason, economics departments routinely screen 
job applicants on the basis of their Ph.D. affiliation (Moore and Newman, 1977; Carson and 
Navarro, 1988; and Barbezat, 1992). The Ph.D. quality variable is included in the models to capture 
possible unobserved quality dimensions of a heterogeneous faculty.    
To capture the effects of the promotion-tournament schemes on salary, we included two rank 
variables in the model.  Rank II has a value of one if the individual is an associate professor in the 
US or a reader/senior lecturer in the UK and zero if not.  Rank III has a value of one if the individual 
holds the rank of professor in the US or UK.  Both rank variables are expected to have a positive 
impact on salaries with the magnitude of the effect greater in the UK because of the automatic pay 
progression in the higher ranks under the national salary schedules. 
Finally, we included a Gender variable having a value of one for males and zero for females. 
 A number of US studies of academic labor markets have reported a statistically significant salary 
differential, which favors males (Johnson and Stafford, 1974; Ferber, 1974; and Hirsch and Leppel, 
1982).  Recently Blackaby and Frank (2000) estimated an earnings equation for a national sample of 
UK academic economists.  They reported a negative earnings gap of 9.1 percent for married women 
and a 14.1 percent gap for unmarried women.  Based on these studies, we expect the Gender variable 
to have a positive impact on salary. 
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Table 2 presents the mean values for all of the variables just discussed for our two samples of 
academic economists.  As shown in the bottom row, in 1999 dollars US economists are higher paid 
than UK economists at every rank.  Professors earn 40.7 percent more in the US, associate 
professors receive 36.0 percent more than reader/senior lecturers, and assistant professor are paid 
40.8 percent more than lecturers.  We explain these differentials in the following sections of the 
paper 
 
4.  Regression Results 
Table 3 presents the estimated regression equations for each country.  Overall, the equations 
are fairly similar, but there are important differences in salary determinants in the US and the UK.  
Let us consider the impact of the model explanatory variables in order of their presentation.
10 
First, even with controls for individual productivity, the experience-earnings relationship 
remains significantly positive and concave in the UK, while in the US experience has no 
independent effects on earnings. These results seem to underscore the importance of the automatic 
pay raises for lecturers and reader/senior lecturers under the UK national salary schedule.  It is also 
possible that professors in the UK receive similar pay increases to maintain their rank salary 
differentials, but we have no ancillary evidence to support this conjecture. 
Second, seniority has a negative effect on relative earnings for US economists, but no 
significant influence on UK salaries.
11  The negative effect is consistent with Ransom=s (1993) 
monopsony hypothesis.  It is not surprising that older economists in the UK are not monopsonized 
under the union negotiated national salary schedules for reasons discussed earlier.  
  15 
 
  
 
Gender is unimportant in the US market; however, it has a marginally significant positive 
influence on UK salaries.  Because we have relatively few females and no female professors in our 
UK sample, we are reluctant to conclude that gender discrimination is present in the UK system.  
When we estimated separate equations for lecturers and reader/senior lecturers, the Gender variable 
had a significant positive coefficient in the reader/senior lecturer equation, but not in the lecturer 
equation (see Table 4 below). 
Ph.D. Quality increases salaries approximately 4 and 6 percent in the two countries.
12  As 
noted earlier, this could reflect a Ahallo@ pedigree effect or a Atrue@ quality differential.  We would 
expect a Ahallo@ effect to dissipate over time as the individual=s quality becomes known and this is 
what we find.  When our model is re-estimated separately for each rank, the Ph.D. Quality variable 
is only significant in the assistant professor and lecturer equations (see Table 4 below). 
In general, the research productivity variables have their expected positive effect on salaries, 
but there are significant differences between the two countries.  As expected, publication of level I 
papers yields the greatest rewards.  Publishing a level I paper increases US salaries by 2.5 percent 
and UK salaries by 1.04 percent.  Publishing a level II paper raises US salaries another 0.86 percent, 
but it has no significant influence on UK salaries.  By itself, this suggests that our list of 50 journals 
included in the Level II category may better fit the US experience.  Finally, we find that Total Other 
Pubs has no significant effect on US salaries while the marginal effect of other publications is about 
0.09 percent in the UK.
 13   
The results presented in Table 3 based on pooled data mask some important differences in 
the rewards to publishing by rank.  Table 4 presents our model estimates by rank for each country.  
We find that publishing level I papers has a significant positive influence on salaries in the US at all 
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three academic ranks.  In contrast, production of level I papers appears to influence only the salaries 
of professors in the UK.  This may reflect the fact that such articles are relatively rare among 
lecturers and reader/senior lecturers (see Table 2) and that promotions to professor are heavily 
influenced by the publication of level I papers.  In that case, the rewards from publishing papers in 
top-tier journals are simply delayed in the UK system.  In the US the rewards to publishing such 
articles are immediate. 
Table 4 shows that a publication in a level II journal has a positive impact on the relative 
earnings of both professors and associate professors in the US, but has no effect on the relative 
earnings of assistant professors.  The latter result is a bit surprising.  It may reflect that assistant 
professors are regarded as in training and that departments want to encourage them to develop their 
research skills.  Note that in the US, assistant professors are rewarded for their publications in other 
outlets, which are far more numerous than their production of level I and II papers (see Table 2).  US 
departments have to reward level I publications or risk losing outstanding assistant professors to 
other universities.  This is not as important for assistant professors producing level II papers. 
In the UK, only readers/senior lecturers are rewarded for level II papers.  Lecturers may not 
be rewarded for such publication for the same reason that assistant professors in the US are not.  
Also, among lecturers relative earnings appear to be independent of differentials in the production of 
level I papers and publications in other outlets.  It appears then that the rewards to younger faculty in 
the UK come through promotions rather than immediate salary increases.  These results confirm the 
importance of the fixed national salary scales and the infrequency of discretionary pay increases. 
It is puzzling that professors in the UK are rewarded for publications in other outlets, but not 
in level II journals. Just the opposite is true for US economists as shown in Table 4.  One 
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explanation, as suggested earlier, may be that some journals important in the UK have not been 
included in our list of 50 level II journals and that some other journals that have been included are 
not regarded as highly in the UK.  There are numerous studies that rank journals in the US, but we 
know of none that specifically rank journals in the UK and Europe.  More research needs to be done 
in this area.  It may also be that professors are rewarded differently in the two countries.  We have 
no way of testing these two possibilities with our data. 
Table 3 shows that Chair Years has a significant positive influence on salaries in both 
countries.  The annual payoff is 1.89 percent in the US and 1.44 percent in the UK.  Evaluated at the 
sample means, the average chair payoff is approximately 16 percent in the US and 14 percent in the 
UK.  We were a bit surprised by the UK results because we were told chairs in that country only 
receive extra compensation while they are in office.  It is likely this variable is picking up the effects 
of an important omitted variable such as teaching quality.  Chairs are not randomly selected.  Some 
of the skills necessary for being selected chair may be highly correlated with other skills valued by 
the university that are not included in our model. 
Table 3 clearly shows that rank has its privileges.  The Rank II and Rank III variables have a 
large positive influence on salaries in both countries after accounting for the impact of productivity 
differentials.  Relative to Rank I, the Rank II premium is 11 percent in the US and 14 percent in the 
UK.  The Rank III premium relative to Rank I is 28 percent in the US and 34 percent in the UK.  
These results are consistent with the operations of promotion tournaments in both countries.  The 
higher rank premiums and the lower publication premiums, especially in the lower ranks, in the UK 
also tell a consistent story.  Under the national salary scales, research productivity compensation is 
deferred and delayed through the promotion mechanism.  Universities are less concerned about 
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losing productive researchers to other universities.  In the US, departments actively compete to 
recruit productive scholars.  Departments must pay younger scholars their market value or risk 
losing them. 
It is also possible that part of the estimated rank premiums reflect the effects of omitted 
variables.  In the US, individuals usually take on additional service and administrative duties after 
they are promoted to associate professor.  They often teach a wider array of classes, begin 
supervising graduate studies, and serve on more committees.  These activities are not included in the 
model.  Teaching quality is a major consideration in promotion to senior lecturer in the UK and may 
also be important at least at the margin in US promotions.  Because we do not include teaching 
quality in our model, the rank variables may be partially capturing this effect. 
 
5.  Decomposition Analysis of Salary Differentials 
In this section we use the decomposition analysis developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca 
(1973) to separate the observed US/UK average salary differential into its component parts.  Based 
on the same salary equation estimated for each country, we can compute the portion of the 
differential explained by the regression, 
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where the first term on the right is the difference in the average level of characteristics weighted by 
the US coefficient value.  The second term is the difference between the slope coefficients in the 
separate regressions, weighted by the mean level of UK characteristics. 
The results of our decomposition analysis are reported in Table 5.  Based on the systematic 
component of the regressions, the model predicts that UK academic economists should earn 6.52 
percent more than US economists (see column 1).  This predicted differential is the sum of a 6.51 
percent differential favoring US economists based on their superior characteristics (see column 2) 
and a 13.04 percent differential favoring UK economists based on their higher estimated coefficients 
(i.e., payoffs) as shown in column 3.   
US economists have a characteristic advantage in the professor rank (4.37 percent), in Level 
1 Articles (1.46 percent), and in Level II Articles (1.94 percent).  The professor characteristic 
advantage is caused in part by restrictions placed on the number of senior level positions in the UK 
system.  US economists may produce more Level I and Level II Articles because of their reward 
structure.  US economists have a 6.02 percent coefficient differential for Level I and Level II  
Articles.  In the highly competitive US market, academic economists= national reputations and 
market values are determined more by the quality than the quantity of their research output. 
The major variables contributing to the 13.04 percent coefficient differential favoring UK 
economists are 16.46 percent for Experience and 8.63 percent for Seniority.  These positive 
differentials are directly related to the automatic pay increases built into the national single salary 
schedule.  The payoffs (i.e., coefficients) for experience are much lower in the US than in the UK.  
Seniority has a negative influence on US academic economists salary, but virtually no impact on UK 
salaries because of the national pay schedules.
14 
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The small predicted UK salary premium (6.52 percent) is more than offset by the intercept 
differential of 46.62 percent favoring US academic economists.  The intercept differential represents 
the influence of other factors not accounted for in our model.  We believe the primary factors 
causing the 46.22 percent intercept differential favoring US economists are the monopsony power 
created by the federal funding of higher education and the single salary schedule which restricts 
market competition and disallows discipline salary differentials.  The UK teachers union does not 
have sufficient bargaining power to offset the federal monopsony.  As a consequence, the negotiated 
salary schedule leads to below competitive wages that are on average well below US salaries.  As 
shown in Table 5, the average salary for UK economists is 40.10 percent below the average salary 
earned by US economists. 
 
6.  UK Actual Salaries Versus Predicted US Salaries 
In this section we ask the counterfactual question, how much would a UK academic economist 
earn if he worked in the US rather than in the UK?  To make this calculation, we multiply the mean 
characteristics of UK economists times the model coefficients for the US equation and sum them 
plus the intercept  ].   +   )     X [(
US
0
US UK β β • ∑  Table 6 presents the predicted salaries and the estimated 
percentage differential for UK academic economists.  We use the US rank equations reported in 
Table 4 to make these predictions.  We find that the average UK professor would earn 40.17 percent 
more in the US.  This is very close to the 40.7 percent raw differential observed in the data.  The 
primary reason for this is that UK professors are quite comparable to US full professors in terms of 
the human capital (i.e., Experience and Seniority) and research productivity (i.e., Level I and II 
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Articles and Total Other Pubs) variables in our model.  In terms of perceived quality, these two 
groups are approximately equal. 
For the lower ranks, the predicted salary differentials are smaller than the observed raw 
differentials.  The predicted move differential for lecturers is 30.8 percent; whereas, the raw 
differential is 40.8 percent.  For reader/senior lecturers, the predicted move differential is 33.1 
percent versus a 36.0 percent raw differential.  The main reason for the predicted move differential 
to be lower than the raw differential for the lower ranks is that lecturers and reader/senior lecturers 
in the UK have produced, on average, fewer Level I and II Articles than assistant and associate 
professors in the US (see Table 2). 
This raises the question of whether the low pay for UK academic economists relative to other 
employment opportunities within the UK and academic economists= pay in the US has led to a 
decline in the quality of economists entering UK academe.  In this regard Machin and Oswald 
(2000) note there were no Britons in the1998 entering class of Economics Ph.D. students at the 
London School of Economics and at Nuffield College in Oxford.  Also, they report that in the 1980s, 
8 out of 10 of those with Warwick Firsts in economics proceeded to higher education somewhere in 
Europe or North America, but in 1998 the figure was 3 out of 10.  Britons are being replaced by 
foreigners in UK graduate programs and faculty in economics in recent years.  The same is true in 
the US.  Given the employment opportunities and pay differentials favoring US academic 
economists, one has to wonder about the UK=s ability to compete for foreign students and faculty.  
Our analysis suggests that the UK may be falling behind in the US in the junior ranks of academic 
economists.  
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7.  Summary and Conclusions 
This study estimates a modified human capital earnings model to explain the variation in 
salaries for two samples of academic economists: one for the US and the other for the UK.  In 
constructing the model and interpreting the results, we consider the four major differences in the 
two countries= higher education compensation schemes.  Below the professor rank, UK 
academics are paid under national salary schedules funded by the central government.   
Professors negotiate with their individual universities, but a salary floor is set above the 
reader/senior lecturer schedule maximum at the system level.  In contrast, US academic salaries 
are set in highly competitive markets and they vary systematically across universities.  Within 
the lower ranks, UK salaries rise uniformly each year whereas salary increases in the US are tied 
to productivity.  Both countries operate promotion tournaments.  In the US, promotions are 
primarily based on research productivity at all ranks.  In the UK, promotions to reader and 
professor are based on research but promotions to senior lecturer are based on teaching quality.  
Also, the UK system places restrictions on the proportion of faculty in the senior ranks, whereas 
US universities do not. 
Finally, with the exception of medicine, there are no discipline pay differentials under the 
UK national salary schedules.  In the US, discipline pay differentials can exceed 40 percent.  It is 
more costly for rigid non-discipline pay systems to recruit when the opportunity costs for economists 
rise rapidly.  We would expect that UK universities would have a more difficult time than US 
universities recruiting Ph.D. students and faculty in economics in recent years as the opportunity 
costs in that discipline have risen quite rapidly. 
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Our regression results show that salary premiums are higher in the UK for Experience, 
Seniority, Rank II, and Rank III.  These results are largely driven by the UK=s union negotiated 
national salary schedules, which include uniform automatic annual pay increases for lecturers and 
reader/senior lecturers and a salary floor on professor=s salaries above the maximum pay for 
reader/senior lecturers. 
The salary premiums for level I and level II articles are higher in the US; whereas UK economists 
receive a salary premium for publishing in other outlets and US economists do not.  These results 
suggest that the highly competitive US market places a premium on the quality of publications, 
while the UK system is more willing to reward the quantity of publications.  These results also are 
influenced by the UK=s national salary schedule, which provides uniform annual pay increases.  
While discretionary pay increases based on outstanding performance are possible, they are rare.  
Therefore, the rewards to publishing level I and level II papers in the UK are deferred through the 
promotion-tournament mechanism. 
The salary premiums for Ph.D. Quality and Chair Years are positive and roughly equal in the 
US and UK.  The Chair Years results surprised us because we were told that chairs in the UK only 
receive extra compensation while they are in office.  In contrast, US chairs rarely have their salaries 
reduced when they leave office.  We find weak evidence suggesting that Gender discrimination may 
be present in the UK, particularly at the reader/senior lecturer rank.  We find no evidence of Gender 
discrimination in the US. 
Our decomposition analysis shows that very little of the observed gross salary differential 
favoring US economists can be attributed to superior characteristics of US economists or to larger 
marginal returns.  In fact, the explained regression differential actually favors UK economists by 
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6.52 percent.  The unexplained intercept differential of 46.62 percent, which favors US economists, 
more than offsets the explained differential. This leaves a net salary differential favoring US 
economists of 40.10 percent.  The shift differential may be caused by two factors: (1) the monopsony 
power created by the UK=s central funding of higher education in conjunction with the national 
salary schedule, which restricts market competition; and (2) the absence of discipline salary 
differentials, which makes it prohibitively costly for the UK to raise economists= salaries in the face 
of rising opportunity costs. 
The latter conclusion is supported by our analysis of predicted versus actual salaries by rank.  We 
find the predicted salary differentials for UK economists are smaller than the observed raw 
differentials for the lower ranks.  This result is driven by the relative low production of Level I and II 
Articles by lecturers and reader/senior lecturers compared to assistant and associate professors in the 
US.  It appears that the relatively low pay offered academic economists in the UK is making it 
difficult to attract high quality younger economists compared to the US. 
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Table 1.  Composition of Sample and Comparison with other Studies 
 
 
 
 
 Present 
 Study 
 
 Blackaby  & 
 Frank 
 (2000) 
 
 Booth  & 
 Burton 
 (1999) 
 
 Machin  & 
 Oswald 
 (2000) 
 
 HEFCE 
 (1996) 
 
Percent Within Rank: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Lecturers 
 
  35.7 
 
  37.8 
 
  44.8 
 
  44.1 
 
  -- 
 
   Senior Lecturer/Reader 
 
  26.9 
 
  20.1 
 
  21.4 
 
  25.2 
 
  -- 
 
   Professors 
 
  37.3 
 
  25.3 
 
  18.8 
 
  20.1 
 
  -- 
 
   Researchers 
 
   0.0 
 
   4.7 
 
  12.0 
 
  10.6 
 
  -- 
 
Distribution of Faculty by RAE 
Score: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   5+ 
 
   7.1 
 
  12.9 
 
  11.4 
 
  B 
 
  13.4 
 
   5 
 
  22.8 
 
  23.7 
 
  20.8 
 
  B 
 
  27.8 
 
   4 
 
  51.9 
 
  28.1 
 
  20.1 
 
  B 
 
  32.2 
 
   3
a 
 
  14.2 
 
  25.6 
 
  34.3 
 
  B 
 
  21.2 
 
   2 
 
   3.9 
 
   8.5 
 
  12.4 
 
  B 
 
   4.2 
 
   1 
 
   0.0 
 
   1.3 
 
   1.0 
 
  B 
 
   1.2 
 
Percent Female by Rank: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Lecturer 
 
  20.0 
 
  B 
 
  19.0 
 
  B 
 
 -- 
 
   Senior Lecturer/Reader 
 
   9.0 
 
  B 
 
  11.24 
 
  B 
 
  -- 
 
   Professor 
 
   0.0 
 
  B 
 
   4.06 
 
  B 
 
  B 
 
aThis category combines A3 upper@ and A3 lower.@ 
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Table 2.  Model Descriptive Statistics: Variable Means 
 
US Faculty  
 
UK Faculty  
 
 
  
Model 
Variables 
 
  
All 
Faculty 
 
  
Asst. 
 Prof. 
 
 
 Asso. 
 Prof. 
 
  
Full 
 Prof. 
 
 
 All 
Faculty 
 
  
Lecturer
s 
 
 Readers 
   &  
Sen. Lect. 
 
 
Professors 
 
Experience 
 
 16.41 
 
 5.55 
 
 13.98 
 
 22.08 
 
 16.70 
 
 8.91 
 
 16.97 
 
 23.98 
 
Seniority 
 
 12.62 
 
 4.15 
 
 11.91 
 
 16.48 
 
 11.40 
 
 6.64 
 
 13.47 
 
 14.47 
 
Gender (M=1) 
 
 0.95 
 
 0.88 
 
 0.93 
 
 0.98 
 
 0.90 
 
 0.80 
 
 0.91 
 
 1.00 
 
Ph.D. Quality 
 
 0.41 
 
 0.38 
 
 0.42 
 
 0.42 
 
 0.21 
 
 0.16 
 
 0.15 
 
 0.30 
 
Tot Other Pubs 
 
 20.57 
 
 6.23 
 
 10.22 
 
 31.40 
 
 31.34 
 
 9.22 
 
 22.50 
 
 58.92 
 
Level I Articles 
 
 2.67 
 
 0.70 
 
 2.09 
 
 3.76 
 
 2.09 
 
 0.31 
 
 1.41 
 
 4.28 
 
Level II Articles 
 
 6.82 
 
 1.73 
 
 4.16 
 
 10.20 
 
 4.57 
 
 0.93 
 
 2.82 
 
 9.32 
 
Chair Years 
 
 0.86 
 
  B 
 
 -- 
 
 1.58 
 
 0.96 
 
  B 
 
  B 
 
 2.57 
 
Ph.D. Dummy 
 
 1.0 
 
 1.0 
 
 1.0 
 
 1.0 
 
 
 
 0.76 
 
 0.79 
 
 0.67 
 
Senior Moves 
 
  
 
  B 
 
 0.05 
 
 0.50 
 
 
 
  B 
 
 0.09 
 
 0.72 
 
RAE Score 
 
  B 
 
  B 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 
 
 4.22 
 
 3.94 
 
 4.23 
 
London (%) 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 
 
 0.13 
 
 0.21 
 
 0.12 
 
Scotland (%) 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 
 
 0.07 
 
 0.12 
 
 0.16 
 
Other (%) 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 
 
 0.80 
 
 0.67 
 
 0.72 
 
Citations 
 
 88.62 
 
 5.20 
 
 28.91 
 
 147.00 
 
 168.07 
 
 16.47 
 
 49.53 
 
 409.24 
 
Sample Size 
 
 181 
 
 40 
 
 45 
 
 96 
 
 126 
 
 45 
 
 33 
 
 48 
 
Salary ($ 1999) 
 
 
 
$55,600 
 
$66,500 
 
$94,800 
 
 
 
 $39,500 
 
 $48,900 
 
 $67,400 
 
  32 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3.  Salary Equations For US and UK Academic Economists 
 
United States 
 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 Model 
 Variables 
 
 Mean 
 (Std.  Dev.) 
 
 Coefficient 
  (|t| - value) 
 
 Mean 
 (Std.  Dev.) 
 
 Coefficient 
  (|t| - value) 
 
Experience 
 
 16.4143 
 (75.52) 
 
 0.00575 
 (0.81) 
 
 16.7063 
 (113.23) 
 
 0.0156* 
 (3.06) 
 
Experience
2  
 
 337.646 
 (92692) 
 
 -0.00003 
 (0.19) 
 
 391.436 
 (150777) 
 
 -0.00032* 
 (2.55) 
 
Seniority 
 
 12.6187 
 (67.47) 
 
 -0.00772* 
 (3.32) 
 
 11.4047 
 (96.11) 
 
 -0.00015 
 (0.08) 
 
Gender (M=1) 
 
 0.9447 
 
 0.02474 
 (0.55) 
 
 0.9047 
 
 0.06616** 
 (1.68) 
 
Ph.D. Quality 
 
 0.4088 
 
 0.04329* 
 (2.04) 
 
 0.2063 
 
 0.05980* 
 (2.14) 
 
Total Other Pubs. 
 
 20.569 
 (648.54) 
 
 0.00081 
 (1.55) 
 
 31.341 
 (1754.3) 
 
 0.00088* 
 (2.66) 
 
Level I Articles 
 
 2.6685 
 (12.34) 
 
 0.02519* 
 (7.32) 
 
 2.0873 
 (16.24) 
 
 0.01041* 
 (3.11) 
 
Level II Articles 
 
 6.8232 
 (53.83) 
 
 0.00861* 
 (4.19) 
 
 4.5714 
 (38.21) 
 
 0.00221 
 (0.81) 
 
Chair Years 
 
 0.8563 
 (5.63) 
 
 0.01895* 
 (4.02) 
 
 0.9603 
 (5.22) 
 
 0.01441* 
 (2.42) 
 
Rank II 
 
 0.2486 
 
 0.10176* 
 (2.42) 
 
 0.2698 
 
 0.13067* 
 (4.22) 
 
Rank III 
 
 0.5303 
 
 0.27692* 
 (5.26) 
 
 0.3730 
 
 0.29549* 
 (7.67) 
 
Intercept 
 
 1.0000 
 
 10.8722* 
 (208.86) 
 
 1.0000 
 
 10.4060* 
 (260.37) 
 
F-Value 
 
 
 
 58.83 
 
 
 
 48.19 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
 
 
 0.7795 
 
 
 
 0.8059 
 
N 
 
 181 
 
 181 
 
 126 
 
 126 
 
Log Salary ($1999) 
 
 11.2313 
 (0.081) 
 
 
 
 10.8284 
 (0.0729) 
 
 
 
  *Significant at .05. 
**Significant at .10. 
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Table 4.  US and UK Salary Equations by Rank 
 
United States 
 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
Full 
 Professors 
 
 
  
    Asso. 
 Prof. 
 
  
 
 Asst 
 Prof 
 
  
 
 Professors 
 
  
 Readers 
 & 
 Sen. Lect. 
 
  
  
Lecturers 
 
Experience 
 
 0.0178 
 (1.17) 
 
 -0.0110 
 0.59) 
 
 -0.0111 
 (0.72) 
 
 0.0031 
 (0.36) 
 
 0.0232* 
 (2.56) 
 
 0.0279** 
 (1.82) 
 
Experience
2  
 
 -0.0003 
 (0.85) 
 
 0.0003 
 (0.49) 
 
 0.0010 
 (1.33) 
 
 -0.00006 
 (0.29) 
 
 -0.0006* 
 (2.09) 
 
 -0.0007 
 (1.46) 
 
Seniority 
 
 -0.0081* 
 (2.62) 
 
 -0.0022 
 0.33) 
 
 -0.0185 
 (1.67) 
 
 -0.0022 
 (0.95) 
 
 0.0036 
 (0.94) 
 
 -0.0016 
 (0.26) 
 
Gender (M=1) 
 
  B 
 
 0.0664 
 (0.93) 
 
 0.0293 
 (0.72) 
 
  B 
 
 0.1522* 
 (2.86) 
 
 0.0151 
 (0.25) 
 
Ph.D. Quality 
 
 0.0502 
 (1.42) 
 
 0.0262 
 (0.71) 
 
 0.0652* 
 (2.17) 
 
 0.0390 
 (0.94) 
 
 -0.0011 
 (0.02) 
 
 0.1476* 
 (2.24) 
 
Tot. Other Pubs. 
 
 0.0003 
 (0.49) 
 
 0.0018 
 (0.77) 
 
 0.0035* 
 (2.00) 
 
 0.0010* 
 (2.97) 
 
 -0.0003 
 (0.22) 
 
 -0.0007 
 (0.37) 
 
Level I Art. 
 
 0.0231* 
 (5.17) 
 
 0.0423* 
 (4.15) 
 
 0.0385* 
 (2.92) 
 
 0.0133* 
 (3.79) 
 
 -0.0003 
 (0.04) 
 
 0.0269 
 (0.57) 
 
Level II Art. 
 
 0.0099* 
 (3.68) 
 
 0.0135* 
 (2.23) 
 
 0.0003 
 (0.04) 
 
 -0.0009 
 (0.29) 
 
 0.0154* 
 (2.77) 
 
 0.0148 
 (0.62) 
 
Chair Years 
 
 0.0193* 
 (3.41) 
 
  B 
 
  B 
 
 0.0158* 
 (2.70) 
 
  B 
 
 -- 
 
Intercept 
 
 11.0384* 
 (65.02) 
 
 10.9806* 
 (73.27) 
 
 10.9436* 
 (204.16 
 
 10.9329* 
 (128.31) 
 
 10.3772* 
 (118.83) 
 
 10.3818* 
 (169.41) 
 
F-Value 
 
 19.69 
 
 4.02 
 
 5.46 
 
 6.42 
 
 5.04 
 
 2.40 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
 0.6115 
 
 0.3547 
 
 0.4777 
 
 0.4853 
 
 0.4945 
 
 0.2029 
 
N 
 
 96 
 
 45 
 
 40 
 
 47 
 
 34 
 
 45 
 
*Significant at .05. 
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Table 5.  Decomposition of the US/UK Salary Differential 
 
 Total 
 Amount 
 Attributable 
 
 Amount 
 Attributable  to 
 Characteristics 
 
 Amount 
 Attributable  to 
 Coefficients 
 
 
 
 Variable 
 
) - ( X   +   ) X - X ( US   =   X   -   X
UK
i
US
i
UK
i
UK
i
US
i isup
UK
i
UK
i
US
i
US
i β β β β β ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 
Experience 
 
 -0.1663 
 
 =  -0.0017 
 
 -0.1646 
 
Experience
2 
 
 0.1151 
 
 =  0.0016 
 
   0.1135 
 
Seniority 
 
 -0.0957 
 
 =  -0.0094 
 
 -0.0863 
 
Gender (M=1) 
 
 -0.0365 
 
  =  0.0010 
 
 -0.0375 
 
Ph.D. Quality 
 
   0.0054 
 
 =  0.0088 
 
 -0.0034 
 
Tot. Other Pubs. 
 
 -0.0107 
 
 =  -0.0087 
 
 -0.0020 
 
Level I 
 
   0.0455 
 
  =  0.0146 
 
   0.0309 
 
Level II 
 
   0.0487 
 
 =  0.0194 
 
   0.0293 
 
Chair Years 
 
 0.0027 
 
 =  -0.0020 
 
   0.0044 
 
Asso. Prof 
       or 
Reader/Sen. Lect. 
 
 -0.0100 
 
 =  -0.0022 
 
 -0.0078 
 
Professor 
 
   0.0366 
 
 =  0.0437 
 
 -0.0069 
 
Subtotals 
 
 -0.0652 
 
     0.0651 
 
 -0.1304 
 
Shift Coefficient 
 
   0.4662 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
   0.4010 
 
 
 
 
 
  35 
 
 
 
 
  
 
36 
Table 6. Actual UK Salary Versus Predicted US Salary For UK Faculty 
 
 UK 
 Faculty 
  
 
 Actual  UK 
 Average  Salary 
 ($1999) 
 
 Predicted  US 
 Average  Salary 
 ($1999) 
 
 Percentage 
 Differential 
 
All Faculty 
 
 $50,433 
 
 $70,690 
 
 40.17% 
 
Professors 
 
 $66,131 
 
 $94,398 
 
 42.74% 
 
Readers and Senior 
Lecturers 
 
 $48,645 
 
 $64,758 
 
 33.12% 
 
Lecturers 
 
 $39,058 
 
 $51,085 
 
 30.79% 
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  APPENDIX - Level II Journals 
 
1.  American Economics Associate Papers and Proceedings 
2.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
3.  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
4.  Canadian Journal of Economics 
5. Econometric  Theory 
6.  Economic History Review 
7.  Economic Development and Cultural Change 
8. Economic  Inquiry 
9.  European Economic Review 
10.  History of Political Economy 
11.  Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
12.  Journal of the American Statistical Association 
13.  Journal of Business 
14.  Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 
15.  Journal of Comparative Economics 
16.  Journal of Econometrics 
17.  Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control 
18.  Journal of Economic History 
19.  Journal of Economic Literature 
20.  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
21.  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
22.  Journal of Finance 
23.  Journal of Financial Economics 
24.  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
25.  Journal of Health Economics 
26.  Journal of Human Resources 
27.  Journal of Industrial Economics 
28.  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
29.  Journal of International Money and Finance 
30.  Journal of International Economics 
31.  Journal of Labor Economics 
32.  Journal of Law and Economics 
33.  Journal of Legal studies 
34.  Journal of Money Credit and Banking 
35.  Journal of Macroeconomic 
36.  Journal of Mathematical Economics 
37.  Journal of Monetary Economics 
38.  Journal of Public Economics 
39.  Journal of Regional Science 
40.  Journal of Royal Statistical Society 
41.  Journal of Urban Economics 
42. Kyklos 
43.  National Tax Journal 
44.  Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
45.  Oxford Economic Papers 
46. Public  Choice 
47.  Rand Journal of Economics 
48.  Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
49.  Scottish Journal of Political Economy 
50.  Southern Economic Journal 
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  Endnotes 
 
 
 
1.  See for example: Malkiel and Malkiel 1973, Johnson and Stafford 1974, Hirsch and 
Leppel 1982, and Ransom 1993. 
2.  Currently, there are three different salary schedules, which cover approximately 78 
percent of the university teachers (Bett, 1999).  These include: one for pre-1992 
universities; one for post-1992 universities (excluding Scotland); and one for post-1992 
institutions in Scotland.  There are some differences between these schedules in terms of 
equivalent staff in different categories of institutions and in the length of the scales and 
number of incremental points within them. 
3.  For purposes of analysis, we shall assume there are only three ranks in the UK system: 
(1) Lecturers, (2) Senior Lecturers/Readers, and (3) Professors.  In actuality, the pre-1992 
universities include Lecturer A and Lecturer B grades, but in practice these operate as a 
single grade.  Post-1992 institutions include Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, and Principal 
Lecturer grades.  The first two of these also operate as a single grade, which we will 
designate as Lecturers.  In each category of institutions there is virtual automatic 
progression between the two lowest grades.  In Scottish Conference institutions there is a 
single Lecturer grade covering the equivalent range of academic staff.  We treat the 
Principal Lecturer grade in post-1992 institutions as equivalent to the Senior Lecturer 
grade in pre-1992 institutions and we combine them with Readers to form our second 
basic rank.  Senior Lecturers and Readers posts have long been similar in pay and status 
differing in little more than name (William, Blackstone, and Metcalf, 1974). 
4.  It should be noted that UK academic economists may have some incentives to move 
since individual universities have some discretion in appointing new hires on the national 
salary scale. 
5.  A random sample would have been prohibitively expensive. The sample excludes 
individuals who currently occupy administrative positions above the level of department 
chairperson. 
6.  A number of the 1,000 individuals we tried to contact could not be reached because they 
had retired, were on leave, or the e-mail address was not correct.  A number of others 
reported they only worked part time so they were excluded. 
7.  To update the reported 1992-93 academic salaries for US economists into 1999 figures, 
we used the American Association of University Professors annual figures to calculate 
the growth rate of salaries for between 1992-1999.  To transform the 1999 academic 
salaries for UK economists measured in pounds into dollars we used the O.E.C.D. 
purchasing power conversion factor to calculate dollar figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
8.  It is interesting to note that in the 1984-88 period, the ten academic journals in which 
most articles and communications were published by UK economists were Economic 
Journal, Scottish Journal Political Economy, Applied Economics, Oxford Economic 
Papers, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
Economics Letters, European Economic Review, The Manchester School, Bulletin of 
Economic Research. Only four of these journals are in Diamond’s (1989) list of “core” 
journals and only Economics Letters was published outside the UK. See Johnes (1990).   
 
9.  For the US the Ph.D. quality variable has a value of one if the individual received the 
Ph.D. from a top 13 program (see Moore, Newman, and Turnbull, 1998).  For the UK the 
Ph.D. quality variable has a value of one if the individual received the Ph.D. from 
Cambridge, Oxford, or the London School of Economics, which were the premier 
programs for most of the observation period.  We recognize that the recent 1996 RAE 
evaluations differ somewhat from these. 
  
9.
  A fully interactive specification pooling the US and UK samples revealed significant 
differences in both slope and intercept coefficients between the two markets. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that while earnings distributions in both countries depend 
on similar demographic and productivity characteristics, the marginal returns to specific 
variables can differ. That is, there are differences in institutional characteristics between 
the US and UK academic labour markets, which are reflected in each country’s earnings 
distribution. 
  
11.  In our earlier study we reported that Seniority had no significant influence on US 
academic economists= salaries (Moore, Newman, and Turnbull 1998).  In that study we 
limited our analysis to tenured faculty since heterogeneity tests indicated that assistant 
professors should not be pooled with senior faculty.  In the present study heterogeneity 
tests indicated that in the UK lecturers can be pooled with tenured faculty.  Therefore, for 
purposes of comparative analysis we also pooled all US faculty ranks. 
11.  In semi-logarithmic equations, the percentage effect of a dummy variable on the 
dependent variable is equal to 100 @ [exp(b1) - 1].   
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12.  We also examined three other hypotheses for our sample of UK economists. First, we 
included a Ph.D. dummy variable for whether a faculty member had a terminal degree. 
Unlike the market in the US, where virtually all faculty members have a Ph.D. degree, 
many UK faculty members do not possess a Ph.D. degree. Holding productivity constant 
we found no premium for individuals with a Ph.D. degree. Second, we tested whether 
there were any university or departmental quality effects on salary structure. To proxy 
university quality, we used the Financial Time ratings of UK universities (Financial 
Times, “Britain’s Top 100 Universities,” Wednesday, April 29, 1998). This variable 
never attained significance. To measure department quality we used the RAE seven-point 
rating scale for economics and econometric units. This variable had a significant positive 
effect (.035 with a t-value of 2.35) when added to the UK earnings equations. We do not 
know how to interpret this implausible result. Third, we attempted to test what effect 
mobility has on earnings by including a variable measuring the number of times an 
individual moved between universities subsequent to the lecturer rank. This variable was  
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not significant in any of the specifications. This is understandable since we do not have 
information on individuals who may have received outside offers that were matched by 
their current department. The effect on earnings of counter offers is conceptually the 
same as an actual move for higher pay. 
 
 
13.  It is important to keep in mind that the negative seniority effect in the US data arises 
from the inclusion of assistant professors in the model. As pointed out earlier, we include 
assistant professors in order to conduct the comparative analysis. Other than the seniority 
coefficient, the inclusion of assistant professors does not affect the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 